Categories and Categorization in Grounded Theory

This blog post will attempt to make sense of Ian Dey's long chapter on Categories and Categorization in Grounded Theory. Categories are maddeningly confusing, and at times it seems what Dey reveals in this chapter is like the soft underbelly of a dragon.

Let's start by presenting definitions:
Categories are conceptual "and never just a name or a label" (49). Categories are said to stand alone and refer to a class of things.

Properties, though, can't stand alone and are "conceptual characteristics of a category" (51). They refer to external to external relationships and relate through interaction.

Dimensions represent the spectrum of variation possible within properties. Dey says, "Identifying dimensions therefore involves (internal) differentiation rather than (external) comparison" (52).

I will chart out Dey's example illustrating these three concepts below:

Category-- color
Properties-- shade, intensity, and hue
Dimensions--intensity can be high or low, hue can be dark or light

Dey says this example illustrates the orthodox distinction between properties and dimensions. Here is one good quote from Dey: "Whereas properties and dimensions 'belong' to the thing itself, the categories to which we assign it do not belong to the thing itself but are part of how we choose to classify it" (54). He stresses the point that categories are derived through comparison.

Dey uncovers a confusion within the analytic processes that each of these three refers to. He says that we can apply all of these analytic processes to the same phenomenon. He stresses that each process of analysis has a different purpose: "We use categories to distinguish and compare; we identify properties and attributes to analyze agency and effects; and we measure dimensions to identify more precisely the characteristics of what we are studying" (57). Dey feels that distinguishing these three concepts through purpose is better than seeing them as varying levels of abstraction.

The next section in the chapter presents the classical view of categories as elements in theory. Dey presents this summary before undercutting it completely. Theorizing involves discovering how categories relate to each other, and GT seems to have two ways of relating: one is through relations of similarity and difference, and second through connection and interaction. He provides this example of relating a cat, dog, and bone.

Formal relations based on similarity and difference: puts the cat and dog together
Substantive relations based on connections: puts the dog and bone together

Our understanding of substantive connections is based upon our observation of the process.

Digging deeper, Dey tackles Glaser's "concept indicator model" which Glaser claims "provides the essential link between data and concept" (qtd. in Dey 60). The meaning of the category (or code) is defined in terms of its indicators. Dey uses the example of prejudice as a concept (category). We can't observe the abstract concept of prejudice, but we see it in action, so to speak--through its "indicators." We can look at statements or actions and identify them as indicators of prejudice. Glaser believes that constant comparative analysis slowly builds concepts through "the careful combination of indicators." Concepts, then, become "the 'sum' of its indicators (61). Dey has some questions about Glasers concept-indicator model.

Summing up the chapter, Dey points out that one of the special characteristics of grounded theory "is its firm location in an interactionist methodology." It is focused on explicating social processes in dynamic terms. I think this characteristic of GT is important to remember. The elements of theory--categories, properties, dimensions--and the process of categorization--constant comparison, focus on indicators--all facilitate this interactionist methodology.

Next Dey digs the deepest into "categorization"--the fundamental process of distinguishing and classifying. Here is where things get messy. Dey explores modern developments in categorization that question the simple concept-indicator model of Glaser and it process of basing categorization upon judgments of similarity and difference that seems to figure so largely in GT. As Dey says quite simply: "The identification of categories on the basis of similarity and difference turns out to be rather problematic ... [and] in practice the process of drawing distinctions is much more complicated and ambiguous than the concept-indicator model allows" (66). Great. Pull the rug out from underneath me. Dey reveals that categorization is much more variable than Glaser describes it in his concept-indicator model and "it challenges any simple assumption that categories are 'indicated' by data in a straightforward way" (75).

Dey goes on to describe three alternative understandings of categorization from scholarship done since the 1967 advent of GT. The chapter is dense, so I will include Dey's own summary:

"In the above discussion, we can identify at least four different accounts of categorization. First, we have the classic account, which assumes that category boundaries are crisp, membership is based on common features, and relations between categories are governed by logical operations. Second, we have 'fuzzy' sets, where category boundaries become vague, membership is graded, and relationships between categories become a matter of degree. Third, we have the 'prototypical' model, which stresses the role of category exemplars and shifts focus from membership to degrees of fit. Finally, we have categorization in terms of 'idealized cognitive models' (this is Lakoff) which 'motivate' the creation of categories through various forms of 'chaining' and 'extension'" (86).

After revealing the basic instability of categories and the process of categorization, Dey seems to mollify his reader by stating a hopeful message: "while the processes of categorization may not be strictly logical, neither are they entirely arbitrary" (87). He then provides a number of things the researcher needs to do to render her analysis not entirely arbitrary:

1. Render the cognitive processes of categorization explicit (i.e which of the four approaches to categorization will you take)
2. Assess the adequacy of the cognitive process in terms of the underlying cognitive assumptions employed.
3. Recognize the various processes involved in categorization
4. Identify the aims of categorization (for example, prediction or inference)
5. Make more explicit the grounds (cue or category validity) on which these categories can be realized
6. Identify the underlying conceptual models and make explicit their metonomyic or metaphorical extensions (a la Lakoff) (87)
   

This list is quite daunting, and to me seems to require a level of self-awareness that might be impossible to achieve. I believe that I can attempt to define these foundations for my categorization before I start coding, but I may not be able to get far until I start coding data. Coming back to this list will probably be an important thing to do after my pilot study.

The larger point of Dey's chapter is summed up in a statement he makes near the end of the chapter: "In grounded theory innocence is preserved and bias precluded by allowing categories to emerge from (and hence correspond to) the data. But Lakoff's analysis suggests that such innocence is impossible to achieve. We think in terms of categories and our categories are structured in terms of our prior experience and knowledge" (92-3). Grounded theory, Dey, believes must reassess how it categorizes in light of new theories that challenge and expand "how categories are actually assigned and used in the production of knowledge" (91).

I always knew that the original description of generating categories from the data was naive; however, Dey has overwhelmed me with the detailed description of this inadequacy. Yet I would rather be aware of these problems and strategically (and perhaps rhetorically) chart my approach to categorization and analysis that enter this forest without a plan. I am hopeful that Dey will offer more explicit suggestions as I keep reading.