Asking the Wrong Questions?

I want to do some "methodological musings" here that relate to both our class reading and my own research interest. I'll first frame my interest in methodology. I am at a stage in my PhD work where I need to define more specifically what I will research and how I will go about researching it. I will need to define my "research question" as well as my philosophy for investigating phenomenon and "making knowledge" from that investigation (in other words, my methodology). My focus of interest is on reflections done between drafts, so my research question is roughly, "What is the role of reflection within the activity of writing?"

Stephen North uses the term "mode of inquiry" in his book The Making of Knowledge in Composition. He offers this rather broad definition of "mode of inquiry": "modes of inquiry--the whole series of steps an inquirer follows in making a contribution to a field of knowledge--as they operate within methodological communities: groups of inquirers more or less united by their allegiance to one such mode, to an agreed-upon set of rules for gathering, testing, validating, accumulating and distributing what they regard as knowledge" (1). Interestingly, North frames validity in methodologies as a social construct: "An inquiry produces knowledge to the extent to which it is sanctioned by some community of inquirers"(276). That means if the community validates quantitative, experimental designed studies, then that is what makes "knowledge" for that group. The mechanics of forming belief are socially derived.

North may be right; however, I believe that we might philosophically be able to claim one methodology as better for studying a particular subject or phenomenon than another methodology. The key is what is being studied. Is the subject of study something that fits within what Fred has called "closed systems" or "open systems?" Does this object operate within defined and repeated "laws" of behavior such as we might see in chemistry? Fred summarizes this "scientism" or positivism with this quote:

"The principal method of investigation, which has been exceedingly successful in the last four centuries, has been to isolate significant elements of a repeating natural event and determine cause and effect, combining minute elements in ever larger hierarchies until the specific cause or causes of major events can be understood."

However, not all phenomena is "mechanical" or fitting within constraints of these closed systems. In contrast, some systems are "open" and here is where Prigogine and Stengers make a startling statement:

"while some parts of the universe may operate like machines, these are closed systems, and closed systems, at best, form only a small part of the physical universe. Most phenomena of interest to us are, in fact, open systems, exchanging energy or matter (and, one might add, information) with their environment. Surely biological and social systems are open, which means that the attempt to understand them in mechanistic terms is doomed to failure."

Fred goes on to point to Complexity Theory as theorizing these open systems and stating: "Complexity Theory has shown that complex, self-organizing, adaptive systems behave in ways completely unamenable to the investigative activities of how most scientists have always done science." If we consider that language and language use, especially the act of meaning making through written language is a complex, open system, we are doomed to failure to seek mechanistic, cause-effect answers to language use. For instance, a question like "What effect does reflection have on students' revisions?" would be the wrong kind of answer. The system, the variables, the multiple subjects and multiple ways in which phenomena is influenced and received is too complex to determine any sort of cause-effect relationship that would hold up.

Louise Wetherbee Phelps in her book Composition as a Human Science makes this same point. She has an excellent critique of scientism and positivism in her first chapter, and she also contrasts that method of research and knowing with what she calls "human sciences." She looks to hermeneutics, to interpretation, as a generator of understanding (rather than knowledge as fact) and develops a "third way" with fairly elaborate sources and arguments.

So we come back to this question: What are we after learning or knowing through research? What can we go after through research of language and teaching? By what methodologies will we guide our research investigations? How do we study these open, complex systems? While I can't definitely say what the alternative is, it seems clear that a hypo-deductive method, a test for cause-effect approach, a study premised on mechanistic, closed system assumptions would be in appropriate for studying reflection. It would be doomed for failure.